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13 SUMMARY: 
14 Following my analysis of the evidence provided in Phase 1, my 42 interim recommendations 
15 concerning Fire Safety, Fire Fighting Procedures and Building Regulation, include: 
16 1) 999 Call Handling: 
17 This section consists of 12 recommendations based on my analysis, and that of my team, of 
18 most of the 999 calls concerning the Grenfell Tower fire. The suggested recommendations for 
19 improvements to call handling procedures and protocols include: 
20 • Two changes related to FSG advice for 999 callers in 'high-risk' buildings, to 'get out 
21 stay out' (la). 
22 • Three measures to improve the questions asked by call handlers (I b). 
23 • Two measures to improve the control centre environment (le). 
24 • Five measures to improve miscellaneous issues e.g. advice regarding popular belief in 
25 helicopter rescue (Id). 
26 
27 2) Fire Safety: 
28 This section consists of 15 recommendations, which are based on my analysis of witness 
29 statements relating to survivor observations of the developing fire within Grenfell Tower, the 
30 descriptions they provided of the condition of their flats prior to and during the fire, and my 
31 understanding of current provisions for fire safety in residential high-rise buildings. The 
32 suggested recommendations to improve Fire Safety include: 
33 • Four measures to improve maintenance of compartmentation (2a). 
34 • Three measures related to alerting residents ofthe need to evacuate (2b). 
35 • One measure to reduce the likelihood of fires starting (2c ). 
36 • Two measures to improve wayfinding within stairwells (2d). 
37 • Two measures to improve the evacuation of residents (2e and 2±). 
38 • Two measures to improve detecting and reporting problems with the life safety 
39 measures in the building (2g and 2h). 
40 • One measure to improve smoke extraction systems (2i). 
41 
42 It is noted that some of the recommendations may require regulatory change. 
43 
44 3) Firefighting and Rescue: 
45 This section consists of 12 recommendations, which are based on my analysis of witness 
46 statements relating to their observations of the developing fire, the descriptions from 
47 firefighter witness statements, and oral evidence provided by senior fire officers. The 
48 suggested improvements in Fire Fighting and Rescue include: 
49 • Three measures to reduce the spread of fire and smoke within the building (3a). 
50 • Three measures to improve rescue efforts (3b ). 
51 • Four measures to ensure safe and timely full building evacuation (3c). 
52 • One measure to improve information flow from the control centre to the bridgehead 
53 (3d). 
54 • One measure to deal with high volume of999 calls (3e). 
55 
56 4) Regulatory Changes: 
57 This section consists of three recommendations, which are based on my understanding of 
58 existing building regulations. The suggested regulatory changes include: 
59 • Two recommendations restricting the use of combustible materials in the exterior 
60 construction of all buildings ( 4a). 
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61 • One recommendation on the introduction of sprinkler systems m all high-rise 
62 residential buildings ( 4b ). 
63 
64 1 INTRODUCTION: 
65 On 15 January 2019, I was instructed by the Grenfell Inquiry to suggest a set of interim 
66 recommendations for consideration by the Chairman. They concern Fire Safety, Fire 
67 Fighting Procedures and Building Regulation, and are based on my current analysis of the 
68 evidence relating to the Grenfell Tower fire. It is understood that interim recommendations 
69 suggested by the Inquiry's experts, if accepted by the Chairman, may be made by the 
70 Chairman now or following completion of his Phase 1 report. 
71 
72 To be accepted for consideration, suggested interim recommendations should fall into one or 
73 other of the following two categories: 
74 1. Recommendations that are so urgent that they should be made now and prior to the 
75 completion of his Phase 1 report. To fall into this category the recommendation must 
76 be one which is: 
77 a) obvious in the light ofthe evidence which has been heard at Phase 1; and 
78 b) so urgent on grounds of public safety that it should not be deferred until 
79 either the publication of his Phase 1 report or left to be addressed as a final 
80 recommendation at the end ofPhase 2. 
81 2. Recommendations which are based on the Chairman's findings and analysis in his 
82 Phase 1 report that should not be left to be addressed as final recommendations at the 
83 end ofPhase 2. 
84 
85 In Section 2 I have set out a total of 42 interim recommendations that I believe comply with 
86 the first of the two selection criteria. However, I am aware that the Chairman may decide 
87 that it would be premature to make recommendations where he will be hearing further 
88 evidence on those matters and considering the issues in greater detail at Phase 2. In so far as 
89 this is the case, I put them forward as points to consider at Phase 2. I have arranged the 
90 recommendations in a logical sequence, rather than as a priority list. Throughout, I define 
91 and refer to 'high-risk' buildings as those clad, or partially clad, in combustible materials, in 
92 terms of the external cladding, the external insulation materials, or both. 
93 
94 1.1 About the Author: 
95 I am Professor Edwin (Ed) Galea, founding director of the Fire Safety Engineering Group 
96 (FSEG) at the University of Greenwich. I am the CAA Professor of Mathematical Modelling 
97 (a position I have held since 1992), a Chartered Fire Engineer, a Chartered Mathematician, an 
98 award-winning engineer, and a recognised expert in the field of computational fire 
99 engineering. I am a Fellow of the Institution of Fire Engineers, a Fellow of the Institute of 
100 Mathematics and its Applications, and the Vice chair of the International Association of Fire 
101 Safety Science. I have undertaken research and consultancy in computational fire 
102 engineering for over 30 years. As director of FSEG, I manage the research of 21 full-time 
103 psychologists, fire engineers, CFD specialists, computer scientists and mathematicians 
104 involved in fire science/engineering research and the development and support of the CFD 
105 fire simulation software, SMARTFIRE, and the EXODUS suite of evacuation simulation 
106 software. 
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107 I have collaborated on research projects with agencies and departments of government -
108 British (e.g. Home Office, Department for Transport, CPNI, DSTL, SAPER, and SAGE), US 
109 and Australian- international companies (e.g. Boeing, Airbus, Multiplex, HSBC, BMT, and 
110 Clevertronics) and international regulatory bodies (e.g. International Maritime Organization 
111 (IMO), and International Organization for Standardization (ISO)). 
112 My personal research interests include human behaviour in emergency evacuations, crowd 
113 dynamics, evacuation and crowd dynamics simulation, fire dynamics and CFD fire 
114 simulation. My recent projects include an EU Horizon 2020 project to development a VR/MR 
115 training environment for first responders involved in emergency situations in crowded places, 
116 an EU Horizon 2020 Marie Curie Rise project on wildfires, an IOSH-funded project 
117 concerned with evacuation of high-rise construction sites, an EU Horizon 2020 project 
118 concerned with urban-scale evacuation, a UK government-funded project concerning 
119 marauding armed terrorists, and a project concerned with understanding human behaviour 
120 during dwelling fires, funded by Innovate UK and the EPSRC. 
121 As director of FSEG, I have been involved in a number of third-party technical reviews, 
122 undertaken by FSEG staff, of fire safety strategies submitted by consulting engineers to local 
123 authorities for approval, including the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Building 
124 Control (RBKCBC). The most recent review for RBKCBC was completed by FSEG on 
125 20/07/16. 
126 I have served on several major Inquires and legal cases as an expert in fire and evacuation, 
127 including: the Paddington Rail Crash, the Swiss Air MD 11 crash, and the Admiral Duncan 
128 Pub bombing. I am a Visiting Professor at Ghent University, Belgium, and the 
129 Western Norway University of Applied Sciences (HVL). I am an associate editor of the 
130 Royal Aeronautical Journal and Safety Science. I have received numerous awards for my 
131 research work, including 2001 British Computer Society Gold Medal, 2002 Queen's 
132 Anniversary prize, 2006 and 2018 Royal Aeronautical Society Gold Award, 2008 Society of 
133 Fire Protection Engineers Jack Bono Engineering Communication Award, 2013 Royal 
134 Institution of Naval Architects Medal of Distinction, and the 2014 The Guardian University 
135 Award for Research Impact. 
136 1.2 Assisted By: 
137 In assessing the evidence from 999 calls, survivor witness statements, firefighter witness 
138 statements and video evidence, as part of my Phase 2 work, I am being assisted by my FSEG 
139 colleagues, Dr Lynn Hulse (Research Fellow, 999 calls and survivor witness statements), Mr 
140 Gary Sharp (Research Assistant, firefighter witness statements), Dr John Ewer (Reader, video 
141 evidence and building regulations) and Dr Zhaozhi Wang (Research Fellow, video evidence). 
142 My discussions of the evidence with these colleagues has assisted me in framing these 
143 recommendations. 
144 
145 1.3 Statements: 
146 I confirm that I have no conflict of interest of any kind, other than which I have already set 
147 out in this report. I do not consider that any interest which I have disclosed affects my 
148 suitability to give expert evidence to the Inquiry on any issue on which I have given evidence 
149 and I will advise the Inquiry if, between the date of the report and any Inquiry hearings there 
150 is any change in circumstances which affects this statement. 
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151 
152 I confirm that I understand my duty to assist the Inquiry on matters within my expertise, and 
153 that I have complied with that duty. I also confirm that I am aware of the requirements of 
154 Part 3 5 and the supporting Practice Direction and the Guidance for the Instruction of Experts 
155 in Civil Claims 2014. 
156 
157 I reserve the right to alter my opinions and conclusions in light of any further evidence or 
158 relevant information of which I am currently unaware. I will immediately inform the Inquiry 
159 should such a situation arise. 
160 
161 The opinions I have expressed represent my true and professional opinion on the matters to 
162 which they refer. I have had regard to the evidence that is material to my discipline (including 
163 the oral testimony) and I can confirm that I have discharged my overriding duty to the 
164 Inquiry. 
165 
166 Signature: Date: 02/04/19 
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167 2 RECOMMENDATIONS: 
168 This section contains my recommendations based on the evidence provided in Phase 1 and 
169 my expert opinion. In most cases, a brief justification or explanation for the recommendation 
170 is provided; in the remaining cases, the recommendation is self-explanatory. I use the term 
171 'high-risk' buildings to describe those that are clad, or partially clad, in combustible 
172 materials, in terms of the external cladding, the external insulation materials, or both. Each 
173 recommendation is bold and numbered, with the number enclosed in parenthesis ofthe type, 
174 (3.2). There are four broad groups of recommendations covering: (1) 999 Call Handling, (2) 
175 Fire Safety, (3) Firefighting and Rescue and (4) Building Regulations. Within each ofthese 
176 broad groups, recommendations are clustered in themes. For example, within group (2) Fire 
177 Safety, there are 9 themes, with the first theme being, 2a) Maintaining Compartmentation. 
178 
179 2.1 {1) 999 Call Handling: 
180 The following 11 recommendations are based on my analysis, and that of my team, ofthe 999 
181 calls concerning the Grenfell Tower fire. 
182 la) Call Handling advice to Callers in at risk buildings. 
183 (1.1) An up-to-date register of 'high-risk' buildings should be kept by the control 
184 centre (and Fire and Rescue Service (FRS)). Where possible, high-risk buildings 
185 should be flagged automatically to call handlers. Where this is not possible, they 






(1.2) 999 call guidance for callers in 'high-risk' buildings should be to evacuate, 
if safe to do so. Callers should also be asked to attempt to alert their neighbours, 
if safe to do so. 
192 lb) Call Handling procedures, including the nature of questions asked by Call Handlers to 
193 characterise the incident. 
194 (1.3) If the FRS does not use the Enhanced Information Service for Emergency 
195 Calls (EISEC), BT operators should make it clear to the caller that they should 
196 wait until prompted to speak by the emergency service. 
197 For example: 
198 "Now calling fire and rescue. Please wait while I give them your number, then 
199 speak when they prompt you to." 
200 NOTE: Callers are not necessarily aware that when they dial 999, they will initially be put 
201 through to a BT operator, who may need to read out some call details to the FRS Call 
202 Handler. This may cause confusion, potentially resulting in the Caller interrupting the 
203 discussion between the operator and Call Handler. If this is already part of standard 
204 operating practice, then training of BT Operators/Call Handlers should be improved, perhaps 
205 through the introduction of recurrent training. 
206 
207 (1.4) The FRS call handler should state their region and, when answering on 
208 behalf of another region, make this clear. 
209 For Example: 
210 "London Fire Brigade. Hello caller." 
211 "Surrey Fire and Rescue on behalf of ... Hello caller." 
212 NOTE: The Caller is unlikely to be aware that the FRS is not necessarily the one from their 
213 local region, and may not have local knowledge. It may make communication more efficient 
214 if the Caller knows from the outset that the FRS they are speaking to is from a different 
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215 region. If this is already part of standard operating practice, then training of Call Handlers 






























(1.5) Once the incident is identified as a fire, call handlers must establish the 
address, the type of dwelling, and the location(s) of the fire, the caller and the 
people with the caller within the dwelling. They may need to have a list of 
prompts to ensure that all required information is collected. 
EXAMPLES/NOTES: 
• Street address - request full address with flat AND building number (if 
different, see below), building name (if there is one), street name and 
postcode. 
• Building vs. flat number - as the building could be a high-rise, the 
number provided by the caller in the address may be a flat number, not 
the building number. 
• Floor AND flat numbers - not always volunteered or asked for, are 
essential to obtain, especially for buildings where the numbering system is 
not wholly sequential or regular. It is essential to be clear that this is 
their CURRENT location, and whether they have moved from their own 
home. 
• Current location - This is not simply the room e.g. living room or 
bedroom, but the flat location (floor and number), as the caller may have 
moved to another flat prior, to or during, the incident. For example: 
o "What is the address of the flat you are in at the moment?" 
o "Are you currently in your own home?" 
o If the caller has moved, it may be useful to establish both locations 
i.e. current location and then home location. 
• People present - establish the number of people located with the caller, 
including number of adults, number and age of children and number of 
people with special needs: 
o "Including yourself~ how many adults and how many children are 
in the flat at the moment?" 
246 o "How old are the children?" 
247 o "Does anyone have any special needs regarding their health or 
248 mobility?" 
249 • Repeat back the details recorded and ask for confirmation 
250 NOTE: If this is already part of standard operating practice, then training of call handlers 
251 should be improved, perhaps through the introduction of recurrent training. 
252 
253 le) Nature of the Control Centre environment, equipment available, information 
254 available to Call Handlers, and how this is presented. 
255 (1.6) Call handlers should be aware of the number, location and status of 
256 multiple callers to the control centre about a particular incident. 
257 NOTE: The rapid escalation of the Grenfell incident - the number of separate flat fires 
258 involved -was not recognised by Call Handlers for a considerable period. Focusing on the 
259 building as a whole, instead of the flats therein, contributed to an incoherent narrative and 
260 response. 
261 
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262 (1. 7) Call handlers should be provided with headsets that reduce background 
263 noise in the control centre to make it easier to hear callers. 
264 NOTE: In some of the Grenfell Incident 999 calls, the Call Handlers appear to have had 
265 some difficulty understanding what was said by some Callers. This has a number of serious 
266 implications. In some instances, this could be due to poor connections. However, it is also 
267 possible that the difficulty in understanding these calls was due to background noise within 
268 the Control Centre, as well as at the Caller's end. Headsets provided to Call Handlers should 




273 ld) Miscellaneous Call Handling procedures. 
274 (1.8) When a call handler finds it necessary to consult with a colleague, they 
275 should always inform the caller that they are about to do so. 
276 NOTE: It is possible that cross-conversations, between Call Handlers and colleagues may be 
277 confusing to the Caller. It is suggested that that the Call Handler always informs the Caller, 





(1.9) When a call handler thinks that the caller is speaking to someone else in the 
caller's location, they should clarify this with the caller. 
283 NOTE: Cross-conversations, between the Caller and others may also be confusing to the Call 
284 Handler. When the Call Handler does not understand the nature of a response from the 
285 Caller, or suspects that the Caller may be talking to someone else, the Call Handler should 
286 clarify to whom the remarks are directed. 
287 
288 (1.10) In order to calm callers, it may be necessary to explain to them the roles of 
289 firefighters who they can see, but may not appear to be actively involved in 
290 firefighting or rescue activities. 
291 NOTE: Callers may become frustrated if they can see firefighters from their location who 
292 appear not to be undertaking firefighting or rescue operations to save them. It is important 
293 that the Caller is reassured that the fire service is doing everything that they can to assist the 
294 Caller, so it may be necessary to explain that firefighters may be performing critical support 
295 roles. 
296 
297 (1.11) Call handlers must be prepared to explain to callers who suggest that they 
298 can be rescued by helicopter, that this is not possible. 
299 NOTE: Callers may suggest that they could be rescued from the roof or windows by 
300 helicopters, especially if they hear or see them in the vicinity of the incident. This was also 
301 an issue in Lakanal House, where at least one survivor (Rasheed Nuhu [1,2]) thought that 
302 helicopter rescue was possible from a balcony. This belief, unless challenged, could 
303 encourage occupants to attempt to go to the roof of the building, or disincentivise self-
304 evacuation attempts. It is suggested that the commonly held belief that helicopters can be 
305 used to rescue people from high-rise building fires and/or fight fires is perhaps due to their 
306 depiction in popular culture, such as Hollywood movies, and also the recent success and 
307 highly publicised actions of helicopters in fighting wildfires. It may be necessary to educate 
308 the public that this is not a plausible means of rescue or firefighting in urban high-rise 
309 building fires, through a public information campaign. 
310 
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311 (1.12) If there is a substantial change of circumstances during a fire, such that 
312 the advice from the incident commander changes from 'stay put' to 'get out if 
313 safe to do so', call handlers should call back previous 999 callers and notify them 
314 of the revised advice as a matter of priority. 
315 NOTE: Call handlers dealt with a large number of calls prior to the incident commander 
316 changing their advice from 'stay put' to 'get out if safe to do so'. Rather than waiting for 
317 callers to call back for further advice- as was the case at Grenfell - Caller Handlers should 
318 proactively call back each caller, reassess their situation and notify them of the change in the 
319 FRS advice. 
320 
321 2.2 {2) Fire Safety: 
322 The following 15 recommendations are based on my analysis of witness statements relating 
323 to survivor observations of the developing fire within Grenfell Tower, the descriptions they 
324 provided of the condition of their flats prior to and during the fire, and my understanding of 
325 current provision for fire safety in residential high-rise buildings. 
326 2a) Maintaining compartmentation. 
327 NOTE: The 'stay put' principle is followed devoutly by the fire brigade, building operators 
328 and local government throughout the UK. It is based on the compartmentation principle -
329 containment of the fire within the compartment of fire origin - and is a sound philosophy IF 
330 (and only if) compartmentation can be guaranteed. An essential component of the 
331 'compartmentation' concept is that flat doors leading to the communal areas, and doors 
332 leading to the stairs (means of escape) are rated fire doors with correctly functioning 
333 automatic door closers and smoke seals. It is, therefore, essential that fire doors must meet the 
334 required industry standard when installed and that they are correctly maintained throughout 
335 their lifetime, with regular checks on their suitability. 
336 
337 (2.1) Composite fire doors of the specific type used within Grenfell (Masterdor 
338 Suredor made by Manse Masterdor) installed in residential buildings should be 
339 replaced immediately with a fire door that has been shown to meet the FD30S 
340 requirements. 
341 NOTE: The Inquiry has been informed of findings that many of the composite fire doors 
342 present in Grenfell (Masterdor Suredor made by Manse Masterdor) fail to meet the industry 
343 standard FD30S fire test- with one sample glazed door substantially failing, after surviving 
344 for only 15 minutes, rather than the required 30 minutes (see Dr Lane's supplemental report 
345 at BLASOOOOO 19 _ 0019 at 19.5.16 and METOOO 19996). It has been further suggested that the 
346 Masterdor Suredor made by Manse Masterdor did not even undergo the required 'smoke' 
347 component of the test when tested originally, and so cannot be considered to provide 












(2.2) Composite fire doors installed within high-rise residential buildings should 
be checked to ensure that they have met the FD30S requirements (including that 
both faces of the door have been demonstrated to meet the appropriate standard 
(BS 476-22 or EN1634-1)). If appropriate documentation is not available, the 
doors should be tested immediately. Should the doors fail to meet the standard, 
they should be replaced immediately, if they are used within a high-risk 
residential building. Composite fire doors in other high-rise residential buildings 
failing to meet the standard should be replaced, subject to a risk assessment 
undertaken by the local authority. 
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360 (2.3) It is essential that regular checks by the appropriate authorities are 
361 undertaken to ensure that external flat doors leading to the communal areas, and 
362 doors leading to the common stair core (means of escape) of all residential high-
363 rise buildings are appropriate functioning fire doors. This includes the integrity 
364 of the smoke seals around the doors and the presence of appropriate functioning 
365 automatic door closers. Where doors are found to be inadequate, deficiencies 
366 must be rectified, or the doors replaced, urgently. 
367 NOTE: It is clear from many of the Grenfell witness statements that one source of smoke 
368 entering and compromising the communal areas was flat doors left open due to a lack of a 
369 door closer, a malfunctioning door closer or a disconnected door closer. Another issue 
370 highlighted by a number of witness statements was smoke from the communal area entering 
371 their flats from around the door jamb area, suggesting a possible failure or inadequacy of 
372 door smoke seals on the external flat doors leading to the communal areas. Regular checks 
373 are required to ensure that the smoke seals are not damaged or compromised. Ideally, such 
374 checks should be unannounced, so that residents do not have the opportunity to reconnect 
375 door closers in advance of a scheduled visit. It may be necessary to provide checking 
376 authorities with the legal authority to gain entrance to a private flat to make such a check. It 
377 is suggested that the checks should be undertaken at least twice per year. While this is an 
378 essential recommendation for high-risk buildings, this measure should ideally be applied to 
379 all high-rise residential buildings. 
380 
381 (2.4) It is essential that building residents are made aware of the critical importance 
382 to their safety and that of others, of maintaining the integrity of fire doors and 
383 automatic door closers on their external flat doors, and the doors leading to the 
384 common stair core. They also need to be informed how they can report and request 
385 corrective measures, not only for their flat/communal area, but also for other 
386 flats/communal areas within the same premises. To ensure awareness, it is 
387 recommended that the following measures are taken: 
388 1. Information leaflets (in English, plus other languages, where appropriate) 
389 distributed to each residence in high-rise buildings. 
390 2. Annual safety briefing to residents, with safety briefing for all new residents 
391 on moving in. 
392 3. Regular agenda item for residents committee meetings. 
393 4. Posters within buildings (in English, plus other languages, where 
394 appropriate). 
395 5. National safety advertising campaign similar to the successful 'smoke 
396 detector' and 'smoke kills' campaigns. 
397 NOTE: It is essential that residents are encouraged to take ownership of this issue, based on 
398 the pivotal role they play in their own safety and the safety of their neighbours. They need to 
399 understand the role and importance of functioning door closers in fire safety, so that they do 
400 not disengage them. While this is an essential recommendation for high-risk buildings, this 
401 measure should be applied to all high-rise residential buildings. 
402 
403 2b) Ability to alert residents of the need to evacuate. 
404 NOTE: The evacuation process has two key phases: the evacuation response phase, and the 
405 evacuation movement phase. In the evacuation response phase, occupants are alerted to the 
406 need to evacuate through a traditional bell alarm, for example, or, more effectively, by a 
407 modern voice alarm system. This phase is of fundamental importance because if occupants 
408 are not aware of the danger, they cannot take appropriate action, and will not start to 
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409 evacuate. Early, clear and unequivocal warning of a life-threatening fire is of critical 
410 importance in residential dwellings and hotels, as occupants, such as those in the Grenfell 
411 Tower fire, may be asleep during the incident, or may require more time to evacuate, due to 
412 age or disability. Many fatalities in fires are the result of occupants delaying their initial 
413 response to the incident and their evacuation. 
414 
415 While each ofthe flats within Grenfell Tower had localised smoke detectors and fire alarms, 
416 there were no communal alarms. So, while a resident could be alerted about a fire in their 
417 own flat, they had no idea if there was a serious fire within the building that could potentially 
418 threaten their safety and require them to evacuate. If there is an urgent need to evacuate the 
419 building - because the first line of defence, compartmentation, has failed - currently door 
420 knocks (by the 'waking watch', residents or firefighters), or occupant calls to 999 are the only 
421 way to alert occupants of the need to evacuate, in the absence of a building-wide alarm 
422 system. Clearly this will waste precious minutes that would be better spent actually 
423 evacuating. 
424 
425 As evidenced by Grenfell Tower and Lakanal House, there is currently insufficient resilience 
426 in the fire safety strategy for high-rise residential buildings, as we rely solely on 
427 compartmentation and 'stay put'. Should a full-building evacuation be necessary (e.g. due to 
428 failure of compartmentation), there are no adequate means to notify occupants of the need to 
429 start the evacuation. 
430 
431 (2.5) A building-wide alarm system should be installed in residential high-rise 
432 buildings, which can be selectively activated (manually or by automatic 
433 detection), should a building-wide evacuation be necessary. The proposed system 
434 should be installed immediately in all high-risk high-rise residential buildings; 
435 however, it is suggested that in time, the recommendation should apply to all 
436 high-rise residential buildings. The alarm system should be tested on a regular 
437 basis. 
438 NOTE: The activation of the alarm system needs to be considered carefully. Ideally, it 
439 should happen automatically (via an automated detection system); however, frequent, 
440 unnecessary automatic alarms arising from real but small, manageable fires (not impacting 
441 the safety of those outside the compartment of fire origin), false alarms (resulting from non-
442 fire events) and malicious false alarms, must be avoided. This is because needless 
443 evacuations would result in a significant nuisance to the residents, may be hazardous to the 
444 very young, elderly and People with Reduced Mobility (PRM), and would eventually render 
445 the alarm system ineffective, as it became increasingly ignored by the residents. Manual 
446 alarm systems that can be activated by any resident, while quick, may also result in a high 
447 frequency ofunnecessary and malicious false alarms. 
448 
449 The means of alarming the entire building must therefore be considered carefully. To reduce 
450 false alarms, the automatic detection system could be based on heat (rather than smoke) 
451 detection, with some form of manual activation of the building-wide alarm system. The 
452 activation of a single detector would initially alert the occupants of the flat where the fire was 
453 detected. This would allow them to investigate and (if not a false alarm) attempt to suppress 
454 the fire, if it is sufficiently small. If the fire cannot be tackled safely, they would evacuate 
455 and call 999. At this point, there are several options to alert the entire building, with each 
456 successive option involving more of a delay: 
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457 • The building-wide alarm system could have a manual operation capability, allowing 
458 the flat occupant who has evacuated to activate the alarm. A disadvantage of this 
459 option is that it is liable to frequent genuine and malicious false alarms. 
460 • If a responsible person (waking watch) were available, the system could alert them, 
461 along with the resident, on the first alarm. The responsible person could then 
462 investigate and decide whether or not to call 999. The responsible person would also 
463 have the ability to manually alert the entire building. The disadvantage of this option 
464 is that it is reliant on the presence of a responsible person. 
465 • On arrival, the FRS could manually activate the alarm system, alerting the building. 
466 The disadvantage of this option is that it is reliant on the timely arrival of the FRS; 
467 however, it is noted that in Grenfell, the fire brigade were on the scene at 00:59 and so 
468 could have manually instigated a building-wide alarm as early as 5 minutes after the 
469 first 999 call (at 00:54). 
4 70 • The internal automatic fire detection system could rely on a 'double knock', in which 
471 at least two detectors in two flats must be activated before the entire building is 
472 alerted. The disadvantage of this option - demonstrated by Grenfell - is that an 
473 external fire could spread for some time before the second knock occurs. The fire in 
474 Flat 16, floor 4 was reported at 00:54 and it is not until 01:24 that a 999 call from Flat 
475 96 on the 121h floor reports another internal kitchen fire some 30 minutes after the first 
476 call and some 10 minutes after the spread of the internal fire to the external cladding. 
477 Ideally the building would have been alerted, and the evacuation started, well before 
478 the second flat fire had activated the building-wide alarm. 
479 
480 (2.6) Residents in 'high-risk' high-rise residential buildings should be offered 
481 training in first aid firefighting using hand-held fire extinguishers, fire-blankets, 
482 etc., and appropriate fire suppression equipment should be provided to each flat. 
483 NOTE: Having detected a small fire in a flat, a resident needs to be able to suppress it. The 
484 initial fire in Flat 16 of Grenfell Tower was detected quite early, while the fire was 
485 reasonably small and potentially manageable. Had the person who was alerted been trained 
486 to extinguish a small fire, and in possession of the appropriate equipment, he may have been 
487 able to do so. Furthermore, given the number of high-rise residential buildings within the UK 
488 with combustible cladding, and the time that this situation has existed, it is likely that there 
489 have been hundreds of fires within these types of premises, many of which were controlled 
490 by residents before escalating to life-threatening situations requiring external intervention. 
491 Appropriate training of residents and the provision of appropriate equipment is likely to 
492 address the vast majority of typical fires within these buildings. The training must include 
493 identifying the type of fires that can and cannot be tackled, as well as how to tackle the 
494 former. 
495 
496 (2.7) An annual evacuation drill should be conducted in all 'high-risk' residential 
497 high-rise buildings in order to test the detection, alert and evacuation process. 
498 NOTE: While resident participation in the drill would not be compulsory for residents, the 
499 alerting system must be demonstrated, which may require the involvement of the local fire 
500 brigade. It is suggested that a drill be conducted on at least an annual basis. 
501 
502 2c) Electrical and Gas Appliance Inspections 
503 (2.8) There should be an annual inspection of all electrical and gas appliances in 
504 'high-risk' high-rise residential buildings. 
505 
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506 2d) Safety-related markings within evacuation stairs. 
507 (2.9) Floor numbering in all residential high-rise buildings to be marked clearly 
508 (e.g. 0.5 m lettering in photo-luminescent paint) on each landing at two heights 
509 within the evacuation stairs. In addition, tactile numbering should be located on 
510 the internal surface of each door leading out of the stairwell. 
511 NOTE: Firefighters and evacuating residents had difficulty identifying precisely where they 
512 were during the evacuation of Grenfell Tower. Floor numbering, if it exists, may be obscured 
513 by smoke, or poor lighting, or may simply be too small to see. This can have serious 
514 consequences for communicating essential information, such as the location of people 
515 requiring rescue and fire-related events, to firefighters, particularly if they are then dispatched 
516 to the wrong floor. As part of this recommendation it is suggested that: 
517 • The floor numbering should be located in a standard location, so that firefighters and 
518 residents know where to expect it e.g. the main landing on each floor. In addition, 
519 tactile numbering should be located on the internal surface of each door leading out of 
520 the stairwell to provide an additional means of identifying the floor, should the 
521 numbering not be visible, and to aid the visually impaired. 
522 • The floor numbering should be marked in large lettering, approximately 0.5 m in 
523 height. 
524 • The floor numbering should be located at two heights: head height, clearly visible in 
525 good lighting and smoke free conditions, and near the floor, so that there is a chance 
526 that the numbering can be seen if the stair begins to fill with smoke. 
527 • The floor numbering should be marked in photo-luminescent paint so that it can be 
528 seen easily in low lighting conditions. 
529 
530 (2.10) The nosing of the stairs and the edges of the stairs should be marked with 
531 photo-luminescent paint in all residential high-rise buildings. 
532 NOTE: Many residents reported evacuating down the stairs within the Grenfell Tower in 
533 darkness, due to the presence of smoke, the failure of the emergency lighting, or both. These 
534 conditions slow the progress of evacuation, which identifying the nosing and edge of each 
535 step will help to mitigate. It is noted that this measure was introduced in the World Trade 
536 Center building following the experience of occupants during the first terrorist attack on the 
537 buildings. The introduction of the photo-luminescent paint on the stairs made a significant 
538 difference during the evacuation following the second terrorist attack. 
539 
540 2e) Personal Emergency Evacuation Plan 
541 (2.11) A Personal Emergency Evacuation Plan (PEEP) should be prepared for all 
542 residents of high-rise residential buildings who cannot self-evacuate. 
543 NOTE: Witness and firefighter statements from the Grenfell Tower fire indicate that a 
544 number of Grenfell residents were unable to self-evacuate, due to a permanent condition that 
545 reduced their mobility (e.g. a disability or an age-related condition), or a temporary condition 
546 that reduced their mobility (e.g. injury, illness or pregnancy). In some of these cases, the 
547 person with reduced mobility (PRM) was able to evacuate with significant assistance from 
548 residents or firefighters, who lacked training, equipment and/or procedures that would have 
549 reduced the jeopardy to their safety and that of the PRM. 
550 
551 In office buildings, this issue is addressed through the PEEP, a specifically designed 
552 evacuation plan tailored to the specific needs of the PRM. Should the PEEP require specific 
553 equipment (e.g. smokehoods (see 2.12), evacuation chairs (see 3.6), etc.), training or 
554 procedures, these are the responsibility of the building management. The PEEP is developed 
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555 and agreed with the PRM - it is not imposed - to provide a systematic way to meet their 
556 requirements for safe and timely evacuation. 
557 
558 2f) Smokehoods for Residents of High-Risk buildings 
559 (2.12) In 'high-risk' high-rise residential buildings, a risk assessment should be 
560 undertaken to determine if some or all residents should be provided with 
561 personal smokehoods. 
562 NOTE: In all fires, the presence of toxic smoke is the primary reason why occupants are 
563 unable to evacuate safely. Witness and firefighter statements from the Grenfell Tower fire 
564 indicate that a number of people had difficulty in self or assisted evacuation, due to the 
565 presence of smoke in the communal areas, on the stairs, or both. To address this danger, the 
566 provision of smokehoods for residents of high-risk residential buildings should be considered. 
567 Within the UK, smokehoods have been readily available (for purchase by the public) for over 
568 30 years, and are even provided in hotel rooms in some hotels around the world (e.g. Japan, 
569 Korea and China). They are small, compact and light, and can pack down to a very small 
570 package, making them easy to store and carry. The decision to provide occupants with 
571 smokehoods should be based on a risk assessment, taking into consideration other mitigation 
572 measures, such as the type of building-wide alarm system, the inspection regimes for fire 
573 doors, automatic door closers, electrical and gas appliances, firefighter rescue equipment, etc. 
574 The risk assessment should also consider maximum travel distances from the flat door to the 
575 escape stair door. 
576 
577 2g) Fire Safety Fault Reporting System for Residents 
578 (2.13) In high-rise residential buildings, procedures should be put in place for 
579 residents to easily report faults and problems associated with (a) flat fire doors, 
580 (b) fire doors to the emergency stairs, (c) lifts that are designated as firefighting 
581 lifts, and lifts that may be used as part of the building-wide alerting strategy. 
582 Once an issue has been reported, the local authority must undertake an 
583 inspection and, if required, take remedial action within a specified set period of 
584 time. Failure to complete required remedial works within the required time 
585 should be reported to the local Fire and Rescue Service (FRS). 
586 
587 2h) Regular Inspection of Lifts associated with Fire Safety 
588 (2.14) In high-rise residential buildings procedures should be put in place to 
589 allow the regular inspection of lifts that are designated as firefighting lifts, 
590 evacuation lifts and lifts that may be used as part of the building wide alerting 
591 strategy. Once an issue has been identified, the local authority must undertake 
592 remedial action within a specified period of time. Failure to complete remedial 
593 works within the required time should be reported to the local Fire and Rescue 
594 Service (FRS). 
595 
596 2i) Review and Regular Inspection of Smoke Extraction Systems 
597 (2.15) There should be a review of the operational capabilities of smoke 
598 extraction systems in high-rise residential buildings, to ensure that they are able 
599 to function appropriately when dealing with fires on multiple floors. 
600 Furthermore, consideration should be given to the installation of a manual 
601 override, allowing the fire service, in the event of fires on multiple floors, to 
602 activate smoke clearance on any selected floor. In addition, while regular testing 
603 of the smoke extraction system is a current requirement, this should be extended 
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604 to include an annual cold smoke test of the system to ensure that fire dampers 
605 work as intended. 
606 NOTE: Smoke extraction systems used in residential high-rise buildings are currently 
607 designed to deal with a fire on one floor only. 
608 
609 2.3 {3) Firefighting and Rescue: 
610 The following 13 recommendations are based on my analysis of witness statements relating 
611 to their observations of the developing fire, and the descriptions from firefighter witness 
612 statements and oral evidence provided by senior fire officers. 
613 3a) Reducing fire/smoke spread during firefighting operations. 
614 NOTE: Should evacuation prove necessary in residential high-rise buildings the single 
615 common stairwell is the only means by which the occupants can evacuate. It is thus essential 
616 to keep it clear of fire effluent. During firefighting operations, firefighters lay hose, usually 
617 from one floor below the floor of fire origin, bringing the hose up the stairs and onto the fire 
618 floor, and necessitating the opening of the fire door into the stair core. As the hose blocks the 
619 door - effectively wedging it open - any smoke present in (or that subsequently leaks into) 
620 the communal area is then free to spread into the stair core. This was reported to be an issue 
621 in Grenfell, where a number of witness statements and firefighter accounts suggest that at 
622 least on floors 4 and 5, smoke from the communal area spread into and smoke logged the 
623 emergency escape stair in the vicinity of these floors, at some time(s) during the incident. 
624 Furthermore, if firefighting activities are abandoned without successfully dealing with the 
625 fire, the hose may be left in the doorway, allowing smoke to continue to spread into the stair 
626 core. If the presence of smoke on the stairs results in a significant reduction in visibility, 
627 hose may also become a serious trip hazard. In addition, when attacking the fire within the 
628 flat of fire origin, it is again necessary to open the fire door from the communal area leading 
629 into the flat. This fire door is also necessarily left open - effectively wedged open by fire 
630 hose - allowing smoke to spread from the flat of fire origin into the communal area (and from 
631 there into the emergency stair). 
632 
633 The challenge, therefore, is to give fire hose access between compartments, whilst 
634 minimising the impact on the integrity of fire barriers, such as fire doors. As smoke is a hot, 
635 buoyant, gaseous particulate-laden flow, it tends to rise, filling a fire compartment from the 
636 top down. An open door within the compartment will allow smoke to spill into a 
637 neighbouring compartment, as the hot buoyant gases descend to the bottom of the door soffit 
638 and intercept the top of the open doorway. Closing the door will prevent the smoke 
639 spreading to the neighbouring compartment, but a door wedged open by fire hose will allow 
640 the smoke to spread. 
641 
642 (3.1) To avoid firefighters wedging-open fire doors to the stair core through their 
643 use of hoses, modifications should be implemented to the stair fire door (e.g. 
644 introduction of a hinged door flap in lower part of door) or a common wall 
645 between the communal area and the landing (e.g. introduction of fire hose 
646 couplings). These measures would maintain an effective barrier to the ingress of 
647 smoke from the common lobby into the stair core during firefighting operations. 
648 NOTE: If the fire door could be modified to enable the top part of the door to remain closed, 
649 while the bottom part was open, this would delay the spread of the smoke into the 
650 neighbouring compartment, while allowing the hose to pass through. Clearly, the smaller the 
651 vertical extent of the open bottom part, the longer the neighbouring compartment is likely to 
652 remain free of smoke. The stair door could be modified by introducing a hinged flap in the 
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653 lower part ofthe door (see Annex 1 Figure 1). The flap could extend the entire width ofthe 
654 door (as shown in Annex 1 Figure la), allowing multiple hose lengths to be introduced (see 
655 Annex 1 Figure 1 b), or it could only extend for part of the width of the door, improving the 
656 integrity of the door, while reducing the number of hose lengths that could be accommodated. 
657 
658 Alternatively, the wall between the stair core main landing and the common area could be 
659 modified to allow the insertion or through-connection of hose couplings (as shown in Annex 
660 1 Figure 2). This would preferably be in the wall containing the door, if there were sufficient 
661 space; however, if this were not possible, the wall adjacent to the fire door could be utilised. 
662 Several couplings could be introduced to allow more than one length of fire hose to be 
663 connected (as shown in Annex 1 Figure 2b). When not in use, the coupling would have a cap 
664 similar to that on current dry- or wet- riser fittings. 
665 
666 (3.2) In order to maintain an effective barrier to the ingress of smoke from the 
667 flat of fire origin, into the common lobby and/or from the common lobby into the 
668 stair core, during firefighting operations, firefighting operating procedures 
669 should be modified to allow firefighters to cut a portion of the lower part of the 
670 firedoor out, allowing the passage of fire hose without necessitating the fire door 
671 to be wedged open, OR to make use of a fire/smoke curtain to prevent the spread 
672 of smoke through open doors. 
673 NOTE: The use of deployable fire/smoke curtains (as shown in Figure 3 Annex 1) is a 
674 common and successful firefighting tactic in mainland Europe. Fire/smoke curtains take 
675 seconds to install and can be carried easily on fire appliances. The concept was developed by 
676 Dr Michael Reick (who is also a senior German fire officer (Regional Fire Commander)) in 
677 2005 [3, 4]. 
678 
679 (3.3) The use of Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) should be considered for 
680 residential high-rise buildings to reduce smoke ingress into the stair core, and to 
681 potentially clear the stair core of smoke. 
682 NOTE: PPV is a common tactic in fighting fire in Europe and the USA [5]. Its use is 
683 complex, and depends on a number of factors, including size of the stair, size of the opening 
684 into the stair where the fan is placed, size of the fan, nature of openings on the stair (e.g. 
685 windows, vents, open doors, use of fire/smoke curtains), nature of external wind conditions, 
686 etc. The fire service should explore the experience of using PPV in other countries, and 
687 develop operating guidance for use in UK conditions through both experimentation and 
688 computer modelling. 
689 
690 3b) Measures to improve firefighter rescue efforts. 
691 NOTE: Current procedures and equipment used by firefighters do not protect rescued 
692 residents from breathing toxic smoke during assisted evacuation. During rescue operations, 
693 firefighters were often faced with assisting Grenfell residents to pass through thick toxic 
694 smoke in the common lobbies, the stairs, or both. In some cases, firefighters removed their 
695 own face masks to provide air for victims - which is strictly against firefighter operational 
696 protocols - potentially endangering their own lives and the lives of the people they are 
697 rescumg. 
698 
699 In a number of cases reported in Grenfell firefighter witness statements, firefighters had to 
700 carry or assist victims down the stairs because the lifts were not available for use during the 
701 fire. Given the width of the stairs in residential buildings (about 1 m), the size and weight of 
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702 the victims and the nature of the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and Breathing 
703 Apparatus (BA) that the firefighters wear, it can be extremely difficult to carry unconscious 
704 or semi-conscious casualties, PRM or those injured by the incident. The difficulty of the task 
705 meant that progress down the stairs was slow (endangering both the firefighters and the 
706 rescued) and in some cases, the victim may have been injured during the process. 
707 
708 (3.4) A smokehood should be included in the equipment carried by all FRS BA 
709 crew (not just those on Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) jobs) to protect the 
710 rescued survivor from the smoke and toxic gases they may need to pass through 
711 during the assisted evacuation. Additional smokehoods should be available in 
712 incident command units. 
713 NOTE: Smokehoods (i.e. air filter smokehoods - see recommendation 2.12) have been used 
714 by fire brigades in Europe (e.g. Germany and Austria) to assist in the rescue of trapped 
715 occupants for a number of years, with success. Indeed, in Germany, fire appliances have 
716 been required to carry smokehoods (Fluchhaube) as part of their normal equipment for a 
717 number of years, to assist in rescue operations [ 6]. 
718 
719 (3.5) Additional Extended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA) should be 
720 made more widely available for BA crew undertaking FSG jobs and potentially 
721 for fire crews undertaking firefighting activities. Each firefighter within BA 
722 teams undertaking FSG jobs, should also carry an additional face mask (in 
723 addition to the smokehood) that can be plugged into the EDBA to provide 
724 rescued victims with a supply of air, should it be needed. However, in using 
725 EDBA it is essential to closely monitor firefighters to ensure that safe working 
726 physiological limits are not exceeded before the air supply is expended. 
727 NOTE: The use of EDBA in firefighting and search and rescue is a complex issue, as 
728 extended operations may result in the development of life-threatening heat fatigue. It is not 
729 only the amount of air that dictates how long a firefighter can operate safely on the fire 
730 ground, while wearing Personal Protective Equipment (PPE); other key factors are heat 
731 strain, physical exhaustion and dehydration. By its very nature the PPE is designed to protect 
732 the wearer from the heat of a fire environment; but in providing insulation protection from 
733 the exterior heat, it prevents the dissipation of the internal heat generated by the wearer while 
734 'working hard'. Examples of 'working hard' include wearing (carrying) EDBA (greater 
735 weight than SDBA) while carrying hose and kit, climbing multiple floors and then 
736 undertaking firefighting or search and rescue activities. The trapped heat generated from this 
737 physical activity results in an increase in core body temperature. The greater the rate of 
738 work, the more rapid the increase in core body temperature. 
739 
740 A key physiological limit on working duration is the core body temperature. When core body 
741 temperature exceeds 40°C, heat stroke can occur, which is life threatening, and requires 
742 immediate remedial attention. The challenge is that it is difficult to predict when a firefighter 
743 is likely to succumb to heat fatigue, as this depends on a number of factors, including, 
744 ambient temperature, type of PPE and BA worn, the nature of the activities undertaken, 
745 physical load carried (including the BA), age and gender, personal attributes such as stature, 
746 body composition, strength and aerobic fitness, etc. It is also difficult for the firefighter to 
747 know when they are succumbing to the effects of heat fatigue e.g. adrenaline generated by 
748 firefighters responding to the incident can mask the physiological impact of heat fatigue. 
749 
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750 These points were demonstrated in a series of trials conducted by UK firefighters. The trials 
751 required firefighters to undertake firefighting and search and rescue activities in a four-storey 
752 building under ambient conditions (i.e. not operating within an environment that has been 
753 heated by a fire). The majority of EDBA teams undertaking the trials were forced to 
754 withdraw early by trial officials due to core body temperatures reaching critical levels (core 
755 temperatures were remotely monitored, with an imposed critical limit of39.5°C) [7]. 
756 
757 One of the complications associated with heat fatigue (and dehydration) is impaired 
758 judgement, making it difficult to self-diagnose its onset and recognise errors arising from its 
759 influence. 
760 
761 In terms of search and rescue, the primary purpose of the EDBA would be to provide 
762 additional air for the rescued casualty, should it be required. While this recommendation 
763 suggests wider use of EDBA, it is also strongly suggested that the extensive use of EDBA 
764 should be monitored carefully. Ideally, firefighters should be equipped with a means to 
765 monitor core body temperature, alongside respiration rates (which are currently monitored), 
766 with an alarm triggered if core body temperature approaches critical safety levels, which is 
767 the current practice for air levels [8]. 
768 
769 It is also noted here that repeated wear ofBA, as occurred during the Grenfell Tower fire, is 
770 not desirable (unless core body temperature and hydration levels are known), as the starting 
771 condition of the firefighter is not known with any certainty i.e., they may be starting the 
772 second wear at already elevated core body temperatures, and in a state of dehydration which 
773 can severely limit the safe duration of the second wear. 
774 
775 (3.6) Firefighters undertaking Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) jobs should be 
776 equipped with a means to assist in the extraction of casualties unable to self-
777 evacuate, such as a carry sheet or an evacuation chair. 
778 NOTE: The carry sheet is both inexpensive and light (see Annex 1, Figure 4a), but requires 
779 at least two firefighters to operate, and the task can be difficult, particularly carrying a heavy 
780 individual down the stairs; and, if more firefighters are required, the narrow stairs found in 
781 residential high-rise buildings will make this difficult or impossible. The evacuation chair, in 
782 contrast, is a device that can be operated by a single trained person (see Annex 1, Figure 4b), 
783 to take a PRM down multiple flights of stairs, though several people may be required to 
784 transfer the PRM to the device initially. Research conducted by Prof Galea suggests that an 
785 evacuation chair allows the handler and PRM to descend the stairs at a speed equivalent to 
786 that of an able-bodied person walking down the stairs [9]; however, given the confined nature 
787 of the stairs and associated landings in high-rise residential buildings, it is essential to ensure 
788 that the evacuation chair is able to navigate the stairs and make the tight turns required on the 
789 landings. The chair depicted in Annex1 Figure 4c (Evac-Chair Model 300H MK4 - note 
790 evacuation chair is a generic term, while Evac-Chair is a product name) is an example of a 
791 light-weight, narrow chair suitable for use in the tight confining space of stairs found in 
792 residential buildings. The chair is 0.52 m wide, weighs 9.5 kg, and is capable of carrying a 
793 person weighing 182 kg [10]. The chair depicted in Annex 1 Figure 4c has carried the 
794 depicted person down a 0.97 m wide stair and is negotiating a turn on a landing that is only 
795 1.02 m deep, at its deepest point. As a result, it is suggested that this device is likely to have 
796 been able to negotiate the narrow stairs in the Grenfell Tower; however, it is noted that 
797 obstacles, such as hose in the stairwell, may make it difficult for the device to pass, and the 
798 presence of an evacuation chair on the narrow stairs may create conflict with other stair users. 
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800 3c) Measures to ensure safe and timely full building evacuation. 
801 NOTE: As already described, the 'stay put' principle is a sound philosophy to follow IF 
802 (and only if) compartmentation is maintained, and the fire is contained within the 
803 compartment of fire origin (see Recommendations in 2a). Lakanal House and Grenfell 
804 Tower demonstrate the catastrophic consequences of failing to identify when the first line of 
805 defence ( compartmentation) has failed, and also the fatal consequences of not having an 
806 alternative strategy to replace 'stay put'. It is not sufficient to simply recognise that, given 
807 the current evolving situation, the 'stay put' strategy is likely to be inappropriate; it is also 
808 necessary to have an alternative strategy to fall back on i.e. how to instigate and manage a 
809 partial- or full-building evacuation. It will be extremely difficult for an Incident Commander 
810 to come up with an alternative on the spot, so it is critical that the FRS develop plans for how 
811 they would manage a full-building evacuation in high-rise residential buildings, should this 
812 prove necessary - they must have a 'Plan B'. 
813 (3. 7) Fire and Rescue Services (FRS) must develop procedures and plans for how 
814 they will recognise the need for, instigate and manage a partial or full evacuation 
815 of 'high-risk' buildings within their regions, should 'stay put' prove to be 
816 inappropriate, or the temporary fire safety measures put in place prove to be 
817 ineffective. 
818 NOTE: The FRS should be aware of all 'high-risk' buildings in their area and the 
819 temporary measures put in place to mitigate the risk e.g. Waking Watch and temporary fire 
820 detection/alarm systems. However, in addition, the FRS must develop contingency plans for 
821 how they would instigate and manage a full-building evacuation, should this prove necessary. 
822 The FRS cannot simply rely on 'stay put' or the temporary measures recently introduced. A 
823 key issue to be addressed is how to alert the occupants of the need to evacuate. This may be 
824 achieved through a firefighter instigated door knock, which may require the availability of 
825 considerable human resources in the initial response, and the use of building lifts to speed up 
826 the process. The plans should also include the use of equipment such as smokehoods and 
827 evacuation chairs/carry sheets to assist in rescue operations. While this recommendation 
828 relates to 'high-risk' buildings, it would, ideally, also be applied to all high-rise residential 
829 buildings. 
830 
831 (3.8) FRS must develop an appropriate initial mobilisation response to reported 
832 fires (predetermined attendance) in high-risk buildings, so that they have 
833 sufficient resources available from the outset to instigate and manage full-
834 building evacuation. 
835 NOTE: The FRS predetermined attendance should be appropriate to FRS plans to instigate 
836 and manage a full-building evacuation. This includes not only human resources, but 
837 additional resources, such as smokehoods and evacuation chairs/carry sheets, which may be 
838 required as part of the FRS evacuation strategy. This recommendation applies to all high-risk 
839 buildings, not just residential buildings. It is noted that the local FRS response to a recent fire 
840 in a residential high-rise building in Melbourne involved 80 firefighters and two of the largest 
841 ladder platforms in the city. It is reported that these resources were available on the fire 
842 ground within minutes of the reported fire. The fire occurred in the early hours of the 
843 morning of 04/02/19 within a 40 storey high-rise building recently classified as a 'moderate 




(3.9) If the building lifts or other on-site facilities/equipment are part of, or 
impact on, the FRS full-building evacuation plan, the FRS should make regular 
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848 inspection checks to ensure that they are available and serviceable, should they 
849 be required. If remedial actions are necessary, the FRS should be empowered to 
850 order them, and require them to be actioned, immediately. 
851 NOTE: The frequency of the FRS visits should be considered in conjunction with the 
852 requirements specified in recommendations 2.13 and 2.14. 
853 
854 (3.10) Training for senior fire officers should be expanded to include: 
855 • Aspects of the construction of high-rise buildings that may impact fire 
856 development and firefighting e.g. the nature, type and flammability of any 
857 cladding, and their likely impact on the behaviour of the fire. 
858 • An understanding of the concepts of compartmentation and 'stay put', not 
859 simply from a regulatory and policy point of view, but also in terms of the 
860 scientific and engineering principles that underpin them. The training 
861 should enable the incident commander to identify when compartmentation is 
862 at risk of failing/is failing/has failed and the impact that this will have on 
863 'stay put'. 
864 • Alternative tactics, should a full-building evacuation be required. 
865 NOTE: It is clear from the oral evidence provided by senior fire officers that the training of 
866 fire incident commanders does not currently include (a) details of serious cladding fires in 
867 residential buildings in the UK and around the world and the lessons learnt from these fires, 
868 (b) an understanding of modern construction of high-rise buildings and the implications that 
869 the widespread use of cladding has on fire development and fire fighting, and (c) how to 
870 recognise and respond to a failure of compartmentation arising from a cladding fire or other 
871 causes. As a result, incident commanders have no contingency planning to accommodate a 
872 failure of compartmentation on such a large scale as at Grenfell, and how to instigate and 
873 manage a full building evacuation. The proposed enhanced training should extend to officers 
874 who may be in command during the early phases of a fire. 
875 
876 3d) Measures to improve the flow of information between the control centre, fire 
877 ground and the bridgehead. 
878 (3.11) The FRS should develop a digital recording system that enables FSG 
879 information to be entered into a digital record by the call handler, which is 
880 transferred automatically to the Incident Commander, and the Command Unit, 
881 once one has been mobilised. The digital record should have a facility to be 
882 updated by the Incident Commander (who may wish to prioritise particular 
883 FSG). A two-way digital link should also be available between the Incident 
884 Commander and Bridgehead (to record deployment and updates). 
885 NOTE: From evidence provided by the Call Handlers and the firefighters, it is clear that the 
886 communication of Fire Survival Guidance (FSG) information between the Control Centre, 
887 fire ground and Bridgehead can be slow and potentially error-prone. The fastest technology 
888 currently available should be utilised to relay information and maintain a current record, 
889 accessible to those who need an up-to-date picture. 
890 
891 3e) Dealing with a high volume of 999 Calls. 
892 (3.12) The FRS should develop an enhanced capability to expand the local call 
893 centre capacity by, for example, bringing in additional call handlers, when 
894 dealing with a high volume of calls associated with a major incident. Recourse to 
895 using other FRS call handling facilities should be considered a backup. 
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896 NOTE: On the night of the Grenfell Tower fire, the London FRS Control Centre received an 
897 unprecedented number of 999 calls. While there is a system in place to pass on calls to other 
898 FRS Control Centres around the country, there should also be a capability and capacity to 
899 bring in additional resource at the centre local to the major incident. The required additional 
900 capability may mean: 
901 1. Bringing in additional trained staff to assist with the handling of calls related to the 
902 incident 
903 2. Bringing in additional trained staff to assist with the handling of other calls not related 
904 to the incident. 
905 3. Adding additional lines into the Control Centre. 
906 4. Opening a backup Control Centre. 
907 
908 2.4 {4) Regulatory Changes: 
909 This section consists of three recommendations which are based on my understanding of 
910 existing building regulations. 
911 NOTE: In this section, the focus is on specific safety-related changes to the regulations that 
912 have not already been made indirectly in the other recommendations. It should be noted that 
913 the regulatory changes suggested here do not relate to the issue of whether or not the fa<;ade 
914 materials used in Grenfell Tower were compliant with the Approved Document B (AD B). 
915 Furthermore, the suggestions made here relate to new build construction, not existing 
916 buildings. 
917 
918 4a) Use of combustible cladding materials in the fa.;ade of buildings. 
919 (4.1) The UK should adopt the more stringent European test methods to measure 
920 fire resistance of building materials, in preference to older UK test methods, 
921 when undertaking bench-scale fire tests (small sample fire tests). 
922 NOTE: Part of the difficulty with the current AD B is the confusing use of both UK and 
923 European fire resistance material testing, which are considered to be equivalent, but may not 
924 necessarily result in the same fire rating for a given material. This is because they may 
925 subject the test sample to slightly different fire conditions, such as testing only a surface, 
926 compared with testing a surface and an edge of a test sample, or testing if any individual 
927 component of a composite material is flammable. 
928 
929 ( 4.2) All materials (each separate material) used within the construction of the 
930 external wall (including the fa.;ade) of ALL buildings of greater than two floors 
931 should have a European fire resistance of limited combustibility or better, and so 
932 be classed as A2 or better (i.e. Al). A 'desktop study' should no longer be 
933 considered a viable approach to demonstrate compliance with this requirement. 
934 NOTE: Another area of concern is the fire resistance rating of cladding materials that is 
935 considered appropriate. The guidelines (AD B) are not sufficiently clear on this point, and so 
936 are open to interpretation. The suggested changes to AD B make the choice of material 
937 unambiguous and in-line with the intent of the British Building Regulations. This 
938 requirement should apply to all buildings of more than two floors, in particular, residential 
939 buildings, schools, hospitals, care facilities, etc., irrespective of height. It is noted that the 
940 requirements at the time of the Grenfell fire concerning use of combustible cladding materials 
941 in the fa<;ade had a threshold height of 18 m. It is also noted that the recent proposed 
942 amendments to the Scottish regulations/guidance reduces the threshold height to 11 m. In my 
943 professional opinion both figures (18 m and 11 m) are 'magic' numbers and until a sound fire 
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944 engineering basis is provided to justify the threshold height, it should be set to the equivalent 
945 of greater than 2 floors (approximately half the proposed Scottish threshold). 
946 
947 4b) Introduction of sprinklers in residential high-rise buildings. 
948 ( 4.3) Domestic sprinkler systems should be mandatory in all new residential 
949 buildings (of greater than two floors), and all existing residential high-rise that 
950 are undergoing extensive refurbishment. 
951 NOTE: Given the nature ofthe kitchen fire in Flat 16 at Grenfell Tower (which is currently 
952 believed to have been located initially behind the fridge, adjacent to the window), it is not 
953 clear whether a domestic sprinkler would have been able to suppress the fire and prevent it 
954 from spreading to the exterior cladding (as the fire was shielded by the fridge from the 
955 influence of a kitchen sprinkler head, which would likely have been located in the centre of 
956 the ceiling). Furthermore, given that the fire took hold in the external cladding, an internal 
957 domestic sprinkler system would have been unable to prevent the rapid external spread of the 
958 fire, and it is unlikely that a domestic sprinkler system would have had the capacity to 
959 prevent the internal spread of the external fire over multiple floors. Nevertheless, a domestic 
960 sprinkler system, if correctly maintained, is likely to prevent the spread of most internal fires, 
961 reducing the likelihood that a fire may spread to the exterior, or spread to the interior of the 
962 building, and so endanger those in other parts of the building. 
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a) Hinged flap in the lower part of the door b) fire hose protruding throu h open flap 
Fi ure 1: Introduction of hose fla at the bottom of a fire door. 
Figure 2: Introduction ofhose coupling between stair core and common lobby 
Figure 3: Installation offire/smoke curtain (from 
a) Typical carry sheet b) c) Evacuation chair turning on a 
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